We deepen and extend resource-level theorizing about sustainable competitive advantage by developing a formal model of resource development in competitive markets. Our model incorporates three important barriers to imitation: time compression diseconomies, causal ambiguity and the magnitude of …xed investments. Time compression diseconomies are derived from a micro-model of resource development with diminishing returns to effort. We characterize two dimensions of sustainability: whether a resource is imitable and how long imitation takes. We identify conditions under which competitive advantage does not lead to superior performance and show that an imitator can sometimes bene…t from increases in causal ambiguity. Despite recent criticisms, we rea¢rm the usefulness of a resource-level of analysis, especially when the focus is on resources developed through internal projects with identi…able stopping times.
Introduction
At the core of the …eld of business strategy is the notion of sustainable competitive advantage (Porter, 1985) . The leading approach to sustainability among strategy researchers is to identify hard to imitate resources that underlie a …rm's competitive advantage (Dierickx and Cool, 1989 ; Barney, 1991) . Examples of resource-based advantages include a …rm that has lower costs than competitors due to a proprietary production process or a …rm that generates a superior willingness-to-pay due to an advanced product design. Competitive advantage is sustainable to the extent that it persists over time, with the strategy literature particularly concerned with the threat of competitors neutralizing an advantage through imitation of the underlying resources.
Crisis in the RBV
Although the resource-based view (RBV) retains a central position in strategy research, there is concern that it is no longer serving as an e¤ective engine for moving the …eld forward.
The core assertion of the RBV is that superior performance can be reduced to the possession of valuable, rare and hard to imitate resources. This approach to strategy was originally developed using verbal arguments grounded in economic reasoning (see Peteraf, 1993 , for a synthesis). A prominent attack on the received theory is Priem and Butler (2001) who argue that the link between valuable, rare and inimitable resources and superior performance is tautological. Another of their critiques is that there is insu¢cient attention to how resources actually create value in competitive product markets. Other critiques are possible as well. The core propositions of the RBV are very broad, but they lack depth and speci…city, especially in terms of the strategy dynamics which they consider. For example, analysis tends to start with initial resource heterogeneity and hence the dynamic linkages between imitation processes and initial resource development tend not to be studied.
Despite increasing concerns and dissatisfaction with the RBV, no other perspective has e¤ectively challenged its centrality to the …eld. Resources as a level of analysis distinct from …rms and industries is proving to have great staying power. In particular, researchers in strategy continue to use the RBV extensively to frame and motivate their empirical work. We support the continued use of a resource level of analysis for the study of sustainable competitive advantage. Our objective is to deepen the theoretical foundations of the RBV in ways that address recent criticisms. Speci…cally, we develop a dynamic model of resource development by …rms competing in a market and then use it to elucidate and extend the received verbal theory.
The Phenomena and Our Model
For many resources, the time required for resource development is extensive (Ghemewat, 1991).
The team working on the development of Intel's 386 microprocessor took 48 months ("Intel Corporation: 1968 -2003 ," HBS case study). There is extensive data on time-to-build for new plants (Koeva, 2000 ; Pacheco-de-Almeida et al., 2005), which can be as low as 13 months for simple commodity products such as rubber and more than double for more technologically advanced products such as transport equipment. The development of the Airbus A380 took …ve years (Esty and Ghemawat, 2002) . Several in ‡uential management books emphasize the timing dimension of strategy including the work of Fine (1998) on industry clockspeed and before that the work of Stalk (1988) on time-based competition. Clark (1989) estimates that each day of delay in introducing a new model represents a $1 million loss in pro…ts for a $10,000 car. Timing matters.
Our formal model starts with the forgone revenues due to delays in resource development.
We combine this with a micro-model of the resource development process, which has the following key features. Firms develop resources via discrete development projects that vary in their complexity (Simon, 1996; Rivkin and Siggelkow, 2002) . Spillovers from …rms that have already developed the resource (Mans…eld et al., 1981) can reduce complexity. Spillovers are inversely related to causal ambiguity (Rumelt, 1984; Reed and DeFillippi, 1990) , which is an important barrier to imitation that re ‡ects the extent to which competitors do not understand the sources of a …rm's competitive advantage. Firms exert e¤ort over time towards resource development, with e¤ort at a point in time subject to diminishing returns.
A fundamental property of our resource development process is time compression diseconomies (Dierickx and Cool, 1989) such that the faster a …rm seeks to develop a resource the greater the development costs. 1 Hence, when …rms choose the timing of resource development they face a tradeo¤ between the forgone earnings from delayed deployment of the resource and the increased costs from time compression diseconomies. In making this tradeo¤ we assume that …rms maximize the present value of the revenues from deploying the resource in the market net of the development costs. The use of net present value (NPV) calculations in a continuous time model of investment projects allows us to narrow the gap between research in strategy and …nance.
We focus on a duopoly setting where there is a leader and a follower. In the base model, the leader already has the resource and the follower can seek to imitate the leader's resource, mirroring the standard RBV approach to sustainability. In an important extension, we add initial resource development by leader. A second extension allows the leader to license some of its knowledge about resource development to the follower.
Questions and Contributions
We address several fundamental questions in competitive strategy. What determines the sustainability of competitive advantages based on internally developed resources? Within our model, we can derive a precise answer. What is the relationship between competitive advantage and relative performance? These are distinct constructs in our model. Finally, we consider …rm IP strategy: under what conditions should a leader license its knowledge about the resource development process to a …rm seeking to imitate its resources? What is the optimal level of spillovers for an imitating and an imitated …rm? Our paper is part of an emerging literature that is developing formal theoretical foundations for strategy. The closest prior contributions are Makadok and Barney (2001) and Makadok (2001) , who are also developing formal foundations to the RBV. While their work seeks to formalize the concept of strategic factor markets from Barney (1986) , our focus is on internally developed resources as emphasized by Dierickx and Cool (1989) . Another formal study that takes a resource-level of analysis is Adner and Zemsky (2006) , which considers how resource rents erode over time due to exogenous forces operating in a …rm's environment. 2 We o¤er the …rst formal treatment of resource development and sustainable competitive advantage.
Our theory is more dynamic than prior foundational work in strategy. 3 By working with a continuous time model, we are able to consider time as an explicit part of the …rm's competitive strategy. By sequencing the resource development activities of the leader and follower, we incorporate the e¤ect of the follower's optimal timing on the leader's resource strategy.
In terms of sustainability, we …rst consider whether or not the leader's resource is inimitable. In our theory, an inimitable resource is one that is uneconomical for the follower to develop (rather than literally being impossible to develop), which occurs when the …xed cost of developing the resource exceeds the bene…ts of possessing it. We characterize a dynamic version of this basic mechanism where both the level of the …xed costs and the present value of the bene…ts are endogenously determined by the follower's choice of development time. For resources that are imitated, sustainability depends on how long the follower takes to develop the resource. We derive an explicit expression for the optimal development time of the follower.
We show that sustainability is increasing in both the complexity of resource development and the cost of capital and decreasing in the level of spillovers. Interestingly, the extent of diminishing returns has a non-monotonic e¤ect on sustainability. While some diminishing returns are required for time compression diseconomies, we …nd that increases in the extent of diminishing returns need not imply greater time compression diseconomies and greater sustainability. Rumelt (2003) points out that competitive advantage is not consistently de…ned in the strategy literature and he suggests that settling on a de…nition may be su¢ciently di¢cult that the …eld should consider dropping the term! Our theory o¤ers one approach to making 2 Another branch of the formal literature starting with Brandenburger and Stuart (1996) is deeply foundational and seeks to use cooperative game theory to study the fundamental relationship between the value creation possibilities by sets of participants in an industry and each party's ability to capture value (Lippman and Rumelt, 2003; McDonald and Ryall, 2004) . 3 The work of Casadesus-Masanell and Ghemawat (forthcoming) and Casadesus-Masanell and Yo¢e (2005) is noteworthy in introducing dynamic modeling into the strategy literature.
precise the notion of competitive advantage. We say that a …rm has a competitive advantage over another …rm when resource asymmetries at a point in time give it superior cash ‡ows.
Competitive advantage, as a concept that applies at a point in time, can then be distinguished from intertemporal performance measures based on NPV calculations. The cost of developing the underlying resources, which are incurred prior to the increase in revenues from the competitive advantage, must be factored into performance comparisons. While the leader necessarily has higher performance for inimitable resources, we show that for imitable resources the follower has superior performance for su¢cient spillovers or, equivalently, if causal ambiguity is su¢ciently low.
Causal ambiguity, as a barrier to imitation, is generally taken to be good for leaders and bad for followers. This implies that followers should seek to reduce causal ambiguity by collocating with leaders to facilitate interorganizational learning or by taking actions to increase absorptive capacity (Cohen and Levinthal, 1990) . We con…rm that high levels of causal ambiguity are bene…cial for the leader due to enhanced sustainability. Despite the fact that causal ambiguity delays imitation and raises development costs for the follower, we show that increasing causal ambiguity (and hence decreasing spillovers) can actually increase the performance of followers.
This result, which is counter to the received wisdom in strategy, arises because of the negative impact on the leader's incentive to compress time in its initial resource development. Faster imitation, means slower development by the leader which is harmful to the follower. Finally, we …nd that licensing should be more prevalent the easier it is to develop the resource (i.e., the lower the causal ambiguity and the complexity).
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 speci…es the model. Section 3 derives from …rst principles the extent of time compression diseconomies. Section 4 characterizes the sustainability of the leader's competitive advantage. Section 5 characterizes the optimal development budget of the follower and derives comparative statics on …rm performance. Section 6 extends the model to allow for licensing prior to the follower's resource development. Section 7 extends the model to include initial resource development by the leader. Section 8 concludes. Proofs are in the Appendix.
The Model
There are two …rms competing in an output market. We label the …rms L for leader and F for follower. The leader has a valuable resource (e.g., an o¤shore call center that reduces costs or a process for incorporating advanced safety features into products for which consumers are willing to pay a premium). While the leader is assumed to already have the resource, the follower does not. The follower can imitate the leader and develop its own version of the resource. (In section 7, we extend the model to include initial resource development by the leader.) When the leader has the resource and the follower does not, we say that the leader has a competitive advantage; otherwise the …rms are assumed to be identical and there is competitive parity.
The model is in continuous time denoted by t¸0. Firms incur costs and receive revenues over time and they seek to maximize the net present value of their cash ‡ows for a common discount rate r > 0, which re ‡ects the cost of capital for the …rms. We denote by T F the time at which the follower develops the resource. If the follower does not develop the resource, we set T F = 1.
Product Market Competition
Firm revenues from the product market depend on whether or not the follower has the resource.
From t = 0 until t = T F , the leader has a competitive advantage because it alone has the resource and we denote its ‡ow of revenues by ¼ ca . During the same interval 0 to T F the follower has a competitive disadvantage and its revenues are denoted ¼ cd , which we assume satis…es 0 · ¼ cd < ¼ ca . From time T F there is competitive parity because both …rms have the resource and both …rms have the same revenue ‡ow ¼ cp , which we assume satis…es ¼ cd < ¼ cp · ¼ ca . 4 The present value of the leader's revenues are then
while those of the follower are
It is useful to de…ne ¢ F = ¼ cp ¡ ¼ cd > 0, which is the increase in cash ‡ows for the follower when it completes resource development.
Resource Development
The resource development process has three key attributes: the inherent complexity, the degree of spillovers from the leader to the follower, and the extent of diminishing returns to e¤ort.
The complexity of resource development increases in the number of required steps and the interconnections among them. For example, developing a new product might require steps such as market research, product design, prototype testing, plant construction or modi…cation, and signing up distributors with signi…cant dependencies among them. Such a project would in be more complex, for example, than introducing a process improvement in order ful…llment.
We parameterize the complexity of the resource development process by K > 0.
The follower can potentially reduce the complexity of resource development due to spillovers from the leader (Mans…eld et al., 1981) . For example, the follower may learn about resource development by reverse engineering the leader's product, hiring its engineers and talking to its suppliers. We parameterize spillovers by s 2 [0; 1) and assume that the level of complexity faced by the follower is (1¡s)K. The parameter s can be linked with two important constructs in the strategy literature. The extent to which the follower learns from the leader decreases in the extent of causal ambiguity and increases in the absorptive capacity of the follower. 5 Our model of the resource development process builds on Lucas (1971). 6 The follower exerts e¤ort at time t given by z t¸0 . There are diminishing returns to e¤ort so that the resource development project progresses at a rate (z t ) ® for some ® 2 (0; 1). For a given 5 Thus, we allow for complexity and causal ambiguity to be potentially independent constructs in our theory. This is supported by Ryall (2005) who formally models the inference problem of a follower. 6 We thank Francisco Ruiz-Aliseda for suggesting that we use this under exploited paper. development time T F , an e¤ort pro…le z t must satisfy the following feasibility condition
which assures that all steps are done by the completion date.
The ‡ow of costs associated with resource development are proportional to the e¤ort, c t = bz t . Without loss of generality, we take b = 1. The discounted cost of resource development is then R T F 0 z t e ¡rt dt. We denote a cost minimizing e¤ort pro…le for a given T F by z ¤ t (T F ), which is characterized in the next section. The present value of the follower's resource development costs are then
For the case where the follower does not develop the resource, we set C(1) = 0.
When ® = 1=2 the cost of progress is quadratic. 7 The model is more tractable in this case and we make this simplifying assumption when extending the model in sections 6 and 7.
The follower seeks to maximize the net present value of its cash ‡ows as given by
Time Compression Diseconomies
We begin the analysis by characterizing the relationship between the timing and the cost of resource development. Formally, this involves solving for the cost function C(T F ). Not surprisingly, the cost function depends on the parameters of the development process (K, s and ®) and, as we will show, on the cost of capital r.
The function C(T F ) is de…ned for the cost minimizing e¤ort pro…le z ¤ t (T F ), which balances the following tradeo¤. Diminishing returns to e¤ort (® < 1) calls for spreading e¤ort uniformly over time. On the other hand, discounting calls for delaying e¤ort. There exist closed-form expressions for the optimal e¤ort pro…le and for the resulting cost function. 7 If kt = (zt) ® is the rate of progress made on the project at time t, then when ® = 1=2 we have that c t = z t = k 2 t and the cost of progress is a quadratic function of the rate of progress. Proposition 3.1. For a given project completion time T F < 1, the cost minimizing e¤ort pro…le is
and the resulting cost function is
For the case of a quadratic cost of progress (® = 1=2), we have the simpler expressions
The optimal level of e¤ort increases over time due to discounting and decreases in the total development time (T F ). Figure 3 .1 illustrates the relationship between the development time and development costs for two levels of spillovers. The resource development process exhibits time compression diseconomies: the faster the …rm seeks to develop the resource, the greater the cost. Formally, we have that C 0 (T F ) < 0. There are two sources of the negative relationship between time and costs. First, longer development times reduce the level of e¤ort in each period, which lowers costs due to the diminishing returns to e¤ort. Second, longer development times shift e¤ort into the future, which lowers the present value of e¤ort costs. 8 The functional form of C(T F ) has two convenient properties. First, as the development time goes to zero, costs become arbitrarily large. Consequently, there cannot be a corner solution where resource development is instantaneous. Second, both the cost and the revenue functions depend on T F through an exponential form. This allows us to derive closed form expressions for the optimal development time and …rm pro…ts. The existence of time compression diseconomies is an essential driver of the results in the paper. The concept was …rst related to sustainability by Dierickx and Cool (1989) in their work on resource accumulation. Graves (1989) , who reviews the theoretical and empirical literature on the time-cost tradeo¤ in development projects, identi…es several broad sources of time compression diseconomies. One is diminishing returns to e¤ort. As he states, "a complex R&D task which could be performed by one person in 24 months could not be performed in one month by 24 persons" (p. 2). One way to shorten development projects is to shift tasks from sequential to parallel execution. However, this can result in costly mistakes and rework when there are interdependencies among tasks (since information is lost when tasks are performed concurrently). These sources of time compression diseconomies are re ‡ected in our modeling of the resource development process based on complexity (K) and diminishing returns (®). diminishing returns on the one hand and time compression and sustainability on the other.
There are parallels between our model of resource development and the IO literature on new technology adoption (Reinganum,1981 ; see Hoppe, 2002 , for a survey). As in our model, the new technology adoption literature assumes that there is a time-cost tradeo¤ in that the cost of adoption is assumed to fall over time. Moreover, it assumes that there is an opportunity cost to delay because of reduced revenue ‡ows from the market. However, the process that leads to falling costs is taken as entirely exogenous and as common to all …rms in that literature. Consequently, the cost function C(T ) is exogenously given and the case where a leader develops/adopts the resource and the follower seeks to imitate, which is the focus of our theory, is not been considered.
Resource Imitation and Sustainability
The sustainability of the leader's competitive advantage depends on the resource development strategy of the follower. One possibility is that it is uneconomical for the follower to develop the resource, which would make the resource inimitable. We derive a precise condition for the resources in our model to be inimitable. If the resource is imitable, then the leader's advantage is only sustained for a limited period of time, the length of which is determined by how long the follower takes to develop the resource. We derive an expression for the follower's optimal development time.
For the follower, the size of the investment in resource development is given by C(T F ).
According to standard …nance theory, investment decisions should be driven by net present value calculations. The present value of the investment returns in our model is
, which is the present value of revenue ‡ows with the resource less the present value of revenues without the resource. The present value net of the investment cost is then:
In our theory, both the returns to the investment and the investment cost are endogenously determined by the follower's choice of development time. 10 Due to time compression diseconomies, the follower bene…ts from slowing down resource development, C 0 (T F ) < 0. However, there is a cost to the delay. The follower loses the increase in cash ‡ows ¢ F = ¼ cp ¡ ¼ cd that comes from deploying the resource in the market 
Inimitable Resources
In the left panel of Figure 4 .1, the cost function always exceeds the returns to developing the resource and investing in resource development yields a negative NPV for all …nite times. In such a case, it is optimal for the follower not to develop the resource (T ¤ F = 1). The barriers to imitation are su¢cient to deter resource imitation by the follower and the competitive advantage of the leader is sustainable. We now identify the general condition for the resource to be inimitable.
as well as the optimal size/timing of any investment.
Proposition 4.1. The resource is inimitable if and only if
which assures that the NPV of an investment in resource development is negative for any …nite development time. Inimitability is associated with larger values of K and r and smaller values of ¢ F and s. The e¤ect of ® is non monotonic, with the RHS of (IN) at …rst increasing and then decreasing in ®.
The expression on the right hand side of condition (IN) is a measure of the economic barriers to imitation associated with the resource. For the resource to be inimitable, these barriers must be greater than the returns to resource development as given by ¢ F . As expected, the barriers to imitation are increasing in the complexity (K) of resource development and decreasing in spillovers (s), which in turn depends on the degree of causal ambiguity maintained by the leader and the absorptive capacity of the follower. The cost of capital r increases the barriers to imitation in two ways. By pressuring the follower to delay e¤ort, it magni…es the e¤ect of diminishing returns. Second, an increase in r increases the present value of costs relative to the present value of revenues because costs are incurred earlier. In a static analysis, resources are inimitable when the cost of acquisition exceeds the returns to deploying the resource in the market. We have derived a dynamic version of this mechanism where both the cost of resource acquisition and the payo¤ to deployment are endogenously determined by the time taken for resource development.
The barriers to imitation depend on the extent to which there are diminishing returns to e¤ort at a point in time. In particular, 1=® determines the extent to which there is a convex e¤ect of r, (1 ¡ s) and K on the barriers to imitation. The direct e¤ect of diminishing returns on the barriers to imitation is more complex. The RHS of (IN) is non monotonic in ®. At …rst increases in ® (starting from ® = 0) decrease the barriers to imitation and then for ® su¢ciently high, they raise the barriers to imitation.
Sustainability with Imitable Resources
When inequality (IN) is not satis…ed, resource development is pro…table. Speci…cally, for T F above a threshold the cost curve falls below the returns as illustrated in the right panel of Figure   4 .1. In this case, there is a unique T ¤ F that maximizes the NPV from resource development, which is given by the di¤erence between the two curves. The optimal development time satis…es
, which has a closed form expression.
Proposition 4.2. Suppose that (IN) is not satis…ed. The sustainability of the leader's competitive advantage is given by the optimal development time of the follower, which is
The optimal development time is decreasing in ¢ F and s, increasing in K and r, and non monotonic in ®.
For the case of a quadratic cost of progress (® = 1=2), we get the simpler expression
The greater is ¢ F the more the follower is motivated to compress time and the less sustainable is the leader's competitive advantage. The greater the complexity of resource development after spillovers, as given by (1 ¡ s)K, the longer the follower takes to imitate the leader. Finally, the greater the cost of capital the less pro…table the opportunity and the less motivated is the follower to compress time. The e¤ect of ® is again ambiguous.
Discussion
There are two dimensions to sustainability: whether or not the resource is imitated and if it is, how long imitation takes. Along both dimensions, we …nd that sustainability is increasing in complexity and in the cost of capital and decreasing in spillovers and in the follower's returns to resource acquisition. Interestingly, on neither dimension of sustainability do we …nd Figure 4 .3, an increase in ® makes C 0 (T F ) more negative for low values of T F and less negative for high values of T F . 11 We argue that complexity is a more useful construct upon which to focus. As illustrated in the left panel of Figure 4 .3, increases in K increase time compression diseconomies by making C 0 (T F ) everywhere more negative. This is what underlies the unambiguous e¤ect of complexity on sustainability. Moreover, operationalizing the extent of diminishing returns to e¤ort might 11 For small TF , the optimal e¤ort is high and satis…es z ¤ t > 1 so that the rate of progress (z
® increases in ®. For high T F , the optimal e¤ort is low and satis…es z ¤ t < 1 so that the rate of progress decreases in ®. be much more di¢cult in empirical work than operationalizing the complexity of development projects. This is not to say that diminishing returns are unimportant. With constant returns (® = 1), optimal resource development is instantaneous and the time dimension is lost from the analysis.
Implications for performance and development costs
For imitable resources, the follower's optimal development time determines not only the sustainability of the leader's competitive advantage but also measurable …nancial outcomes. Given the possibility to collect data on resource development budgets, we start by considering the implication of our model for the cost of resource development. One complication is whether to discount costs to the start of the project (t = 0) or to the end of the project (t = T ¤ F ). We consider both points of reference. (ii) The present value of development costs at time t = T ¤ F , which are given by
, is increasing in ¢ F and K, decreasing in s, independent of r and non monotonic in ®.
An increase in the value of the resource to the follower, as given by ¢ F , raises the optimal budget whether discounted to the start or the end of the project. The greater the value of the resource, the more the follower spends to compress the development time.
One might expect the optimal budget to increase with the complexity of the project net of spillovers, (1 ¡ s)K, because harder problems require more e¤ort to solve. This is what we …nd for the present value of costs at completion. However, the relationship can reverse for costs discounted to the start of the project. Complex problems take longer to solve. Because e¤ort is optimally skewed towards the end of the project (Proposition 3.1), discounting can lower the present value at t = 0.
The e¤ect of the cost of capital depends on the point of reference. When discounting back to the start of the project, an increase in the cost of capital lowers development costs. One might expect the reverse e¤ect when discounting forward (i.e., compounding) to the end of the project. In fact, we …nd costs are independent of r in this case. The impact of compounding is exactly o¤set by the fact that the …rm responds to the increase in r by taking longer to develop the resource (Proposition 4.2), which reduces costs. Now consider …rm performance. it lowers the incentive of the follower to compress time. One implication is that it may not be in the interest of the leader to overly press its advantage (e.g., by entering segments that are only marginally pro…table to it but which are important to the follower). The e¤ect of the competitive parity payo¤ ¼ cp on the leader is ambiguous because on the one hand it increases the incentive of the follower to compress time and on the other hand it raises the leader's payo¤ after imitation.
Thus far, we have sought to formalize the classic resource-based approach to sustainability where one …rm has a valuable and rare resource that a competitor is seeking to imitate. One bene…t of formalization is that it can facilitate extending the scope of the theory. To the extent that the base model is tractable, one can enrich the set of actions available to …rms by adding prior stages to the model. We now turn to such extensions.
Licensing
Even when …rms compete in output markets, they may want to cooperate in other realms such as resource development (Bradenburger and Nalebu¤, 1996) . One form of cooperation is the licensing and cross-licensing of patents, which is increasingly common (Shapiro, 2002) . 12 Another form of cooperation related to resource development is providing inputs to competitors. For example, Swatch, which owns many luxury watch brands, provides mechanical watch movement components to much of the Swiss luxury watch industry, although they have announced plans to discontinue this practice. 13 We extend our model to allow the leader to aid the follower's resource development by licensing some of its knowledge about the resource development process. This raises the following questions. When is it possible for the leader and follower to reach a licensing agreement?
How does this depend on whether or not resources are inimitable? What fraction of knowhow should be licensed? We assume that full access to the leader's knowledge reduces the complexity of the resource development project by a fraction 1 2 (0; 1). We allow for partial 12 High pro…le examples of cross-licensing agreements are those between Intel and AMD and between Sony and Samsung. These agreements can be asymmetric with the …rm with the weaker patent portfolio making payments to the other …rm. See "Accord Gives AMD MMX access" in Electronic News licensing, where the leader provides some`· 1 fraction of its knowledge. Licensing functions in an analogous way to spillovers in that complexity is reduced to (1 ¡`)(1 ¡ s)K. 14 The follower pays a …xed fee to the leader for the license. We assume a quadratic cost of progress in resource development (® = 1=2).
We say that licensing at some level`is feasible if there exist license fees that make both …rms better o¤ under licensing than without licensing. Feasibility requires that the gain to the follower from licensing (in terms of faster and cheaper resource development) is greater than the harm to the leader (in terms of a less sustainable competitive advantage). The condition for feasibility of licensing depends on whether or not the resource is imitable. We start with the case of inimitable resources.
Proposition 6.1. Suppose the leader's resource is inimitable. (i) Licensing at some level`is feasible if and only if
(ii) Inequality (L1) is easier to satisfy the greater is ¼ cp , s and`and the lower is ¼ ca , ¼ cd , K, and r. (iii) Necessary and su¢cient conditions for licensing are 2¼ cp ¡ ¼ cd ¡ ¼ ca > 0 ands u¢ciently close to 1.
One can interpret condition (L1) as follows. The expression
is the e¤ect of resource imitation on the combined revenue ‡ows of the two …rms. A necessary condition for feasibility when the resource is inimitable is that resource acquisition by the follower increases these revenue ‡ows. If not, there is no scope to reach an agreement that makes both …rms better o¤. Although necessary, an increase in combined revenue ‡ows is not su¢cient. The increase in combined revenues must be su¢ciently great to o¤set the cost of resource development by the follower, which is not incurred without licensing. As a result, licensing depends on the complexity of the development process ((1 ¡`)(1 ¡ s)K) and the cost of capital.
14 The assumption that 1 < 1 assures that even with full licensing there is still some e¤ort required for resource development. Even in an extreme case such as the follower buying equipment from the leader for an improved production process, there is still some e¤ort required to install the equipment and train workers.
It is never feasible to license a small amount of knowledge about an inimitable resource.
By de…nition, the cost of resource development without licensing exceeds the bene…ts to the follower. Consequently, a small amount of licensing, which only reduces development costs marginally, will not make both …rms better o¤. Conversely, when the leader is licensing almost all of its knowledge (i.e.,`close to 1), the cost of resource development is small and the feasibility of licensing depends only on whether combined revenues increase with imitation.
In summary, licensing for an inimitable resource is feasible when resource acquisition by the follower increases the combined revenue ‡ows of the two …rms and when the leader is licensing a su¢cient amount of knowledge. Now consider resources which are imitated with or without licensing.
Proposition 6.2. Suppose the leader's resource is imitable. (i) Licensing at a level`is feasible if and only if
(ii) Inequality (L2) is easier to satisfy the greater is ¼ cp , s and`and the lower is ¼ ca , ¼ cd , K, and r. (iii) In contrast to inimitable resources, licensing of imitable resources can occur even when 2¼ cp ¡ ¼ cd ¡ ¼ ca < 0 and when`is arbitrarily close to 0.
We …nd that licensing is more likely to occur when the resource is imitable. Because the follower now develops the resource without licensing, the reduction in development costs that comes with licensing contributes to the bene…ts from licensing (in contrast to inimitable resources where the costs of resource development are deducted from the bene…ts). As a result, licensing can be feasible when resource imitation does not increase the combined revenue ‡ow of the two …rms and it may be desirable to license even a small amount of knowledge (i.e.,c lose to 0).
Despite the di¤erences, comparative statics are the same across the two cases. Although one might expect that licensing would be easier to observe the more complex the resource, our theory predicts exactly the opposite. We …nd that licensing is more likely for less complex resource development processes with higher spillovers (i.e., lower (1¡s)K). The more costly it is for a follower to imitate the more likely it is that the …rm should keep its resource knowledge proprietary and exploit the sustainability of its competitive advantage.
So far we have considered the feasibility of licensing an arbitrary fraction`of the leader's knowledge. We now consider the optimal level of licensing when the leader can license any amount of knowledge up to 1 . With e¢cient bargaining, …rms should select the level of licensing that maximize their combined pro…tability (using the license fee to divide the gains).
Proposition 6.3. For both imitable and inimitable resources, the combined pro…ts of the leader and follower are maximized either by licensing all of the leader's knowledge (`= 1 ) or none of it (`= 0).
We …nd that licensing should be an all or nothing proposition. The more knowledge that is licensed, the more the follower is motivated to compress time because the bene…ts of imitation are closer at hand, which increases the returns to further licensing. Joint pro…ts are then a convex function of the amount of knowledge licensed, which leads to a corner solution. Whether full licensing (`= 1 ) is preferred to no licensing (`= 0) is determined by substituting`= 1 into condition (L1) for inimitable resources or into condition (L2) for imitable resources.
Modeling the Creation of Resource Advantage
We now extend the model to encompass the initial creation of competitive advantage by the leader. We assume that the leader faces the same sort of resource development problem as the follower. We consider the following questions: Should the leader develop the resource?
How long should it take? Does the leader's competitive advantage translates into superior performance? How do the answers to these questions depend on resource imitability? Finally, what are the optimal levels of spillovers and causal ambiguity for the leader and the follower.
We add to the base model an initial stage where the leader develops the resource. We denote by T L > 0 the time that the leader takes for resource development and continue to denote by T F the time spent on development by the follower. Because the follower starts its resource development after the leader's development is complete, the follower acquires the resource at time t = T L +T F . Prior to resource acquisition by the leader at time t = T L the two …rms are identical and they both have revenue ‡ows of ¼ 0¸0 . We assume that the follower's revenues decline when the leader acquires the resource and that giving both …rms the resource increases their revenues:
The present value of the leader's revenues are now
The leader faces the same resource development problem as the follower except that as the pioneer it does not bene…t from spillovers. Thus, the leader faces the full level of complexity K. We assume that the cost of progress is quadratic (® = 1=2). From Proposition 3.1, we have that the cost of resource development for the leader and follower are then
The pro…ts of the two …rms are then
The Development of Inimitable Resources
The development of an inimitable resource leads to a permanent increase in the leader's revenue ‡ows of ¢ L = ¼ ca ¡ ¼ 0 . The leader's resource development problem in this case is then analogous to the resource development problem of the follower, only without spillovers.
Substituting ¢ L for ¢ F and setting s = 1 in propositions 4.1 and 4.2 yields the following result. 
The leader has higher pro…ts than the follower.
The leader's competitive advantage is unambiguously associated with superior performance. When the leader does not develop the resource, the two …rms have the same pro…ts.
Relative to this benchmark, the follower must be worse o¤ since it has a competitive disadvantage. Conversely, the leader must be better o¤ because otherwise it would not choose to develop the resource. Thus, the leader has higher pro…ts than the follower.
The Development of Imitable Resources
The development problem for imitable resources is complicated because the leader's returns to resource development fall when the resource is imitated. Speci…cally, the initial bene…t is ¼ ca ¡ ¼ 0 and this is reduced by ¼ ca ¡ ¼ cp with imitation. One can then de…ne the quantity
which gives the e¤ective bene…t of resource development in the case of imitable resources. Once this expression is de…ned, we show that the solution to the resource development problem has the familiar form.
Proposition 7.2. Suppose that the resource is imitable. The leader can pro…tably develop the resource i¤ q ¢ im L > rK, in which case its optimal development time is
The optimal development time of the follower is as before
We can now compare the development of inimitable and imitable resources. The result from part (i) follows immediately from the observation that the returns to resource development are greater when the resource is inimitable (i.e., ¢ L > ¢ im L ). In part
(ii) we show that the comparative statics on the development time of the leader are the same for the two types of resources except for the parameters s, ¼ cd and ¼ cp , which only e¤ect the leader when the follower imitates. The non monotonic e¤ect of ¼ cp arises because it both speeds imitation and lessens the impact on the leader.
Inter-Firm Comparisons and Optimal Spillovers
When both …rms engage in resource development, there are several possible comparisons to consider. We impose the following restriction on the parameters
3) which assures that both …rms engage in resource development. We start with a comparison of their development times and development costs.
Proposition 7.4. Suppose that (7.3) holds and that the increase in revenues is greater for the …rst …rm to develop the resource (i.e.,
The leader spends more time on resource development than the follower unless all of the following hold: s and rK= p ¢ F are both su¢ciently small and ¼ 0 > ¼ cd .
(ii) The leader has a higher cost of resource development (discounted to the time of completion) than the follower unless both of the following hold: s su¢ciently small and rK= p ¢ F su¢ciently close to 1.
The leader both spends more money on resource development and takes longer than the follower as long as there are su¢cient spillovers. While an individual …rm faces a tradeo¤ between speed and cost, su¢cient spillovers allow the follower to outperform the leader on both dimensions. As spillovers become small, however, the …rms increasingly face the same tradeo¤ between speed and cost. Then, whether the leader or the follower is faster and has higher costs depends on which …rm has the greater incentive to compress time (i.e. whether ¢ F or ¢ im L is larger). Interestingly, there is no clear ordering. Although we are assuming that the leader initially experiences a greater bene…t from resource acquisition (i.e.,
the prospect of imitation means that its long-term bene…t from resource acquisition is less than or equal to that of the follower (i.e.,
. Which e¤ect dominates depends on the sustainability of the leader's advantage, which is what introduces the term rK= p ¢ F .
For inimitable resources, the leader's competitive advantage gives it superior performance (Proposition 7.1). Interestingly, the link between competitive advantage and superior performance can break down when the resource is imitable because the costs associated with achieving the advantage may be large relative to the costs of imitation.
Proposition 7.5. Suppose that (7.3) holds. There exists an ¹ s 2 (0; 1) which is increasing in K such that the leader has higher pro…ts than the follower if and only if s < ¹ s.
The association between resource asymmetry and superior performance need not be tautological -a central concern of Priem and Butler (2001) -once one accounts for the cost of resource development. Figure 7 .1 illustrates how …rm pro…ts depends on the level of spillovers.
Without spillovers (s = 0), the follower faces the same cost function as the the leader, but it has a period of competitive disadvantage. Hence, the leader must have superior performance.
As spillovers approach the upper limit of 1, the follower's cost of resource development goes to zero. In addition, the time required for imitation goes to zero, which eliminates the period of competitive advantage for the leader and gives the …rms the same return to resource development. With the same returns and lower costs, it is now the follower that has supe- rior performance. The more complex resource development, the more important are the cost savings from spillovers and the more likely it is that the follower has higher pro…ts.
Firms can take a variety of steps to a¤ect the level of spillovers. Leaders can reduce spillovers and increase causal ambiguity by adopting HR policies that reduce the turnover of key employees (Cappelli, 1999) , through the geographic dispersion of development activities (Zhao, forthcoming) and by patenting (Mans…eld, 1985) . Followers can increase spillovers by investing in R&D activities that increase their absorptive capacity (Cohen and Levinthal, 1990) , by more closely aligning their strategy and organization with that of the leader so as to facilitate interorganizational learning (Hannan and Freeman, 1989) and by locating facilities near to the leader's facilities (Fujita et al., 2000) . As illustrated in Figure 7 .1, the relationship between spillovers and pro…ts need not be monotonic. We now consider the extent of such non-monotonicities by looking at whether or not …rms maximize their pro…ts at extreme levels of spillovers. Spillovers are inversely related to the degree of causal ambiguity. While Proposition 7.6 con…rms the positive association between causal ambiguity and the performance of leaders, we show that followers as well may bene…t from an increase in causal ambiguity. This result, which is contrary to the received wisdom in strategy, arises because higher causal ambiguity assures that the leader has su¢cient payo¤ from resource development to advance quickly.
Conclusion
We have sought to develop a richer rand more dynamic resource-based theory of sustainable competitive advantage. Our theory, with its focus on resources developed in projects with identi…able stopping times, is somewhat more specialized than the received verbal theories of the RBV. To a large extent, however, the strategy of modern corporations can be seen as a series of discrete resource development projects: IT implementation projects for CRM and ERP systems, new product development projects, the construction of new production facilities and the re-engineering or o¤fshoring of particular business processes. Given their ubiquity, we believe that focusing on discrete projects is a promising avenue for both empirical research and for the development of theory that is relevant to strategy practice.
There are many, many possible directions to further develop a strategic theory of resource development. In this paper, we consider sequential development projects by a leader and a follower. It would be interesting to study parallel resource development. In this paper, we consider …rms that are homogeneous but for the possession of the focal resource. There are a variety of ways that one could introduce …rm asymmetries. Firms could vary in the possession of complementary resources that a¤ect the returns to developing resources or they could vary in the time-cost tradeo¤s they face due to di¤erent development capabilities or they could vary in their cost of capital. Another possibility for theory development it to introduce uncertainty, either in the returns to having a resource or in the resource development process itself.
The Hamiltonian for this problem is H(z t ) = ¡z t e ¡rt +¸t(z t ) ® and the necessary and su¢cient conditions for an optimum are that the following holds:
Using (9.3), we have that¸t =¸and z ¤ t = ¡ ®¸e rt ¢ 1=(1¡®) by (9.1). This, together with (9.2), implies that
The expression for C(T F ) then follows from the de…nition C(
for the follower's optimization problem yields
which we can rewrite as
Note the LHS of (9.6) is everywhere decreasing in T F while the RHS is a constant. Hence, there is at most one value of T F at which (9.6) is satis…ed. Moreover, the lower bound on the LHS is 1 and hence a unique solution with T F < 1 exists if and only if (IN) holds. This solution must yield a positive payo¤ and must be a global maximum since lim T F !0 ¦ F (T F ) = ¡1 and
The comparative statics on (IN) with respect to ¢ F , K and s hold by inspection. The e¤ect of ® is given by
, which is increasing in ®. For ® su¢ciently close to 0 the derivative is positive while for ® su¢ciently close to 1 the derivative is negative.
Proof of Proposition 4.2 Solving the …rst order condition (9.6) for T F yields (4.1). To show that T ¤ F is increasing in r it is su¢cient to show that g(r) = 1 r ln 1 1¡rz is increasing in r for rz < 1. We have that g 0 (r) has the same sign as rz ¡ (1 ¡ rz) ln ³ 1 1¡rz´a nd that this is increasing in r and equal to 0 for r = 0. Hence, g 0 (r) > 0. The other comparative statics results are straightforward.
Proof of Proposition 5.1 (i) We have the present value of costs at t = 0 are C(
By inspection, this is increasing in ¢ F and decreasing in r. For (1 ¡ s)K su¢ciently close to zero, costs are increasing in
=r costs are decreasing in (1¡s)K. For ¢ F = 2 and r(1¡s)K = 1=2, we have that costs are decreasing in ® up to about 0.704 and increasing thereafter, which establishes that the e¤ect of ® can be non-monotonic.
(iii) We have the present value of costs at t = T ¤ F are
By inspection, this is increasing in ¢ F and (1¡s)K and independent of r.
is non monotonic in ®, we have that costs are non-monotonic for ¢ F su¢ciently close to 1.
Proof of Proposition 5.2 (i) Suppose that an e¤ort pro…le z t is optimal for some value of ¼ cd . Increasing ¼ cd while holding …xed the e¤ort pro…le increases pro…ts due to increased revenues at the same costs and hence pro…ts also increase for the e¤ort pro…le that is optimal for the increased value of ¼ cd . The same argument establishes that pro…ts are increasing in
Suppose an e¤ort pro…le z t is optimal for some value of (1 ¡ s)K. Decreasing (1 ¡ s)K while holding …xed the e¤ort pro…le results in earlier completion for the same cost and hence higher pro…ts and hence pro…ts will also be higher for the optimal e¤ort pro…le for the lower value of (1 ¡ s)K. Hence, pro…ts are falling in (1 ¡ s)K.
Finally, suppose an e¤ort pro…le is optimal for some value of r. Decreasing r while holding …xed the e¤ort pro…le results in an increase in pro…ts since the earlier occurring costs are in ‡ated less than revenues and hence pro…ts will also be higher for the reoptimized e¤ort.
Hence, pro…ts are falling in r.
(ii) We have that
which is negative for r(1 ¡ s)K su¢ciently small and positive for r(1 ¡ s)K su¢ciently close to its upper bound p ¼ cp ¡ ¼ cd . Hence, the e¤ect of ¼ cp is non-monotonic.
Proof of Proposition 6.1 Suppose that ® = 1=2 and that the resource is inimitable so that p ¢ F · r(1 ¡ s)K. (i) Consider some level of licensing`2 (0; 1). Suppose with licensing it is now optimal for the follower to develop the resource. (Otherwise licensing is not desirable since the total pro…ts of the two …rms are unchanged and it is impossible to make them strictly better o¤.) With licensing at the level`, the combined pro…ts of the leader and follower can be written as
Since licensing has the same e¤ect on the followers optimal development time as spillovers, we have that
The present value of industry pro…ts is then
Without licensing (`= 0) we have that the present value of industry pro…ts with an inimitable resource is
Assuming that the follower wants to develop the resource, licensing at a level`is desirable i¤ ¦ T (`) > ¦ I , which is equivalent to (L1). Because ¦ T (`) > ¦ I assures that resource development increases industry pro…ts, this condition also assures that it increases the pro…ts of the follower.
(ii) The comparative statics on (L1) for`, s, K, r, and ¼ ca follow by inspection. The derivative of the LHS of (L1) w.
Since the RHS of (L1) is positive, a necessary condition for (L1) to hold is that
This is not su¢cient since we can rewrite the LHS as Proof of Proposition 6.2 Suppose that ® = 1=2 and that p ¢ F > r(1 ¡ s)K so that the resource is imitable. (i) Total industry pro…ts are given by ¦ T (`), as de…ned in Proposition 6.1. Moreover, since the follower develops the resource even without licensing, pro…ts without licensing are now given by ¦ T (0). Licensing at a level`2 (0; 1) increases the total pro…ts of the leader and follower i¤ ¦ T (`) > ¦ T (0), which with some algebra is equivalent to (L2). (ii)
The comparative statics on (L2) for`, s, K, r, and ¼ ca follow by inspection. The derivative of the LHS of (L2) w.r.t ¼ cp is (3¼ cp + ¼ ca ¡ 4¼ cd )=(2(¼ cp ¡ ¼ cd ) 3=2 ) > 0 and w.r.t. ¼ cd is
(iii) Suppose that 2¼ cp ¡ ¼ cd ¡ ¼ ca = 0. In the limit as`! 0, we have that inequality (L2) becomes p ¢ F > r(1 ¡ s)K, which is satis…ed as this is the condition that the resource is imitable.
Proof of Proposition 6.3 We have that @ 2 ¦ T =@`2 = 2r(1 ¡ s) 2 K 2 > 0 and total industry pro…ts are a convex function of the amount of knowledge licensed. Hence, if industry pro…ts are increased by licensing an amount`< 1 , they are increased more by licensing 1 . Note that this does not rule out`= 0 being optimal.
Proof of Proposition 7.2 and Corollary 7.3 The problem of the follower is unchanged from that in the proof of proposition 4.2. The leader maximizes
For rK < q ¢ im L , one can solve this equation for an interior T L yields, which is given by (7.2). This establishes Proposition 7.2. Part (i) of Corollary 7.3 follows from ¢ im L < ¢ L . The comparative statics when T ¤ L is given by (7.1) hold by inspection. Suppose the resource is inimitable and T ¤ L is given by (7.2). To establish that T ¤ L is increasing in K, note that (7.2) can be rewritten as
To establish that T ¤ L is increasing in r, it is su¢cient to show that (7.2) can be rewritten as
As for the comparative statics w.r.t. ¼ cp , note …rst that
Because (IN) is not satis…ed, ¢ F ¡ rK (1 ¡ s) > 0 and the sign of @¢ im L =@¼ cp depends on the size of (¼ ca ¡ ¼ cp ). The comparative statics w.r.t. ¼ ca , ¼ cd , ¼ 0 , and s follow by inspection.
Proof of Proposition 7.4 Suppose that Kr < minf¢ im L ; ¢ F g. Then the resource is imitable and the leader develops it. Suppose that
F only holds for s su¢ciently close to 1. We have that ¢ F > ¢ im L is equivalent to
for w = r(1 ¡ s)K= p ¢ F 2 (0; 1). Recall that ¼ ca ¡ ¼ 0 > ¼ cp ¡ ¼ cd . If ¼ cd = ¼ 0 then inequality (9.9) never holds while for ¼ 0 > ¼ cd it only holds for w su¢ciently small.
(ii) We have e rT ¤ L C(T ¤ L ) > e rT ¤ F C(T ¤ F ) is equivalent to ¢ im L > (1 ¡ s) 2 ¢ F . The expression (1 ¡ s) 2 ¢ F is a decreasing, convex function of s which is equal to zero for s = 1. The expression ¢ im L is a linear decreasing function of s which is positive for s = 1. 
The di¤erence in costs (dis- 
where the inequality follows from ¼ ca ¡ ¼ cd > maxf¢ im L ; ¢ F g. Finally, we have
Hence there exists a unique ¹ s such that the pro…ts of the leader are higher i¤ s < ¹ s. We have that
Using the implicit function theorem, we have that @¹ s=@K = ¡ @W @K = @W @s < 0. Proof of Proposition 7.6 To establish that the optimal s for the follower is less than 1, it is su¢cient to show that @¦ ¤ F =@s < 0 at s = 1. The follower's pro…ts are
We then have that
so that @¦ ¤ F =@s < 0 at s = 1 i¤ condition (7.4) holds.
